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United States v. Castleman:
The Meaning of Domestic Violence
Emily J. Sack*
In 2001, James Alvin Castleman pled guilty to having
"intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury" to the mother
of his child, in violation of a Tennessee state criminal law.1 Seven
years later, federal law enforcement authorities learned that
Castleman was selling firearms on the black market. 2 Castleman
was indicted on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), a
federal law prohibiting possession of a firearm by anyone
previously convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence." 3 Castleman moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that his conviction in Tennessee did not qualify as a
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," which required the
use or attempted use of physical force." 4  The federal district
court granted the motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.5 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014) (alteration
in original) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(b) (Supp. 2002)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
2. Id.
3. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). Section 922(g)(9) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., who has been convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.
4. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1409 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Id.; see also United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582 (6th Cir.
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certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits on the degree of force
necessary for an offense to qualify as a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence";6 in 2014, it reversed the Sixth Circuit's
judgment and gave a broad reading to the meaning of force in the
context of domestic violence. 7
United States v. Castleman marks the latest step in a long
series of challenges to the federal domestic violence firearms
prohibition and the second time in five years that this provision
has reached the Supreme Court.8 Though the case concerned
what might appear to be a somewhat technical question of
statutory interpretation-the meaning of "the use of physical
force" in the provision defining a "misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence"-more profoundly, it involved a struggle over the
meaning and dynamics of domestic violence. Castleman's
significance lies in the nuanced understanding of domestic
violence expressed by the majority, which could have impact well
beyond its reading of the firearms prohibition at issue in the case.
To provide context for the debate in Castleman, first, I briefly
explore the motivation for the domestic violence gun prohibition
and the history of legal challenges to the provision since its
enactment. Next, I examine both Castleman's majority opinion by
Justice Sotomayor and the concurring opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, focusing on their competing understandings of domestic
violence. I then raise yet one more challenge to the firearms
prohibition that has been percolating and may be strengthened by
the Castleman holding-a claim that the statute is
unconstitutional on Second Amendment grounds. However,
whatever further attacks on the firearms ban may lie ahead, I
2012); United States v. Castleman, CR. No. 08-20240-Mi, 2010 WL 711179
(W.D. Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).
6. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 49 (2013) (mem.) (granting
certiorari). Compare United States v. White, 606 F.3d 144, 156 (4th Cir.
2010) (applying a more narrow definition of physical force to include only
force "capable of causing physical pain or injury to the victim"), and
Castleman, 695 F.3d at 587 (similarly), and United States v. Hays, 526 F.3d
674, 679 (10th Cir. 2008) (similarly), and United States v. Belless, 338 F.3d
1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (similarly), with United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d
1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (utilizing a broader definition of physical force),
and United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (similarly), and
United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1999) (similarly).
7. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410.
8. See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009).
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conclude that the Court's conception of domestic violence will have
lasting influence on a range of legal issues.
I. GUNS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9)
As the Supreme Court put it in United States v. Hayes,
"[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly
combination." 9 There is a strong link between access to firearms
and domestic violence fatalities. As Senator Lautenberg, the chief
sponsor of section 922(g)(9), stated, "[d]omestic violence, no matter
how it is labeled, leads to more domestic violence, and guns in the
hands of convicted wife beaters leads to death."10 As one study
noted, there is a high correlation between access to guns and
intimate partner homicide; "Iw]hen a gun was in the house, an
abused woman was 6 times more likely than other abused women
to be killed."11 Other studies have found that anywhere from over
half to more than two-thirds of all victims of intimate partner
homicides were killed by guns. 12 As Senator Wellstone, another
supporter of section 922(g)(9), put it, "the only difference between
a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun." 13
In 1996, Congress amended the federal Gun Control Act of
1968 to prohibit firearm possession by anyone convicted of a
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 14 Though the Act had
long banned convicted felons from possessing firearms, the
extension to domestic violence misdemeanors was necessary
because domestic violence offenders were routinely undercharged
or convicted of less serious offenses than their behavior
warranted. As Senator Lautenberg explained, the felony ban was
not keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers, since
"many people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse
9. Id. at 427.
10. 142 CONG. REC. 22986 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
11. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate
Partner Homicide, NAT'L. INST. JUST. J., Nov. 2003, at 14, 16; accord
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408-09.
12. Emily J. Sack, Confronting the Issue of Gun Seizure in Domestic
Violence Cases, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 3, 3 (2005).
13. 142 CONG. REC. 22986 (statement of Sen. Paul Wellstone); accord
Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1409.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). Congress previously had passed a
prohibition on gun possession for anyone subject to a qualifying protection
order. 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(8).
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ultimately are not charged with or convicted of felonies." 15
Therefore, extending the ban to persons convicted of misdemeanor
domestic violence offenses would "close this dangerous loophole." 16
The gun prohibition applies to a person convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence at any time, even if the
conviction was prior to the enactment of section 922(g)(9). 17 The
ban is permanent, and unlike other gun control legislation, it
contains no exemption for police, military personnel, or
government officials. 18 For all of these reasons, as well as general
hostility to gun prohibitions from some quarters, section 922(g)(9)
has been subject to extensive criticism and multiple legal
challenges. 19
II. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FIREARMS
PROHIBITION
A. Claims in the Lower Courts
Challenges to section 922(g)(9) began soon after its
implementation and were based on a number of different legal
grounds, many of them constitutional. However, despite the
multitude of legal attacks, these challenges have consistently been
unsuccessful.
One common early claim centered on the Commerce Clause.
Defendants attempted to rely on United States v. Lopez, in which
the Supreme Court had invalidated a federal firearms possession
statute on Commerce Clause grounds. 20 Particularly after the
Supreme Court struck down another federal domestic violence
provision on these grounds in United States v. Morrison,2 1
15. 142 CONG. REC. 22985 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
16. 142 CONG. REC. 22986 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 436-37 (8th Cir.
2004); United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2000).
18. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, EMILY J. SACK &
JUDITH G. GREENBERG, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 404 (3d ed. 2013). See also 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (2012).
19. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 525, 559-63 (2003); Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the
Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER &L. 1, 11 (2005).
20. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). The statute at issue in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. §
922(q), made it a crime to possess a firearm in a school zone. Id.
21. 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000). The provision struck down in Morrison, 42
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defendants claimed that Congress did not have authority under
the Commerce Clause to enact section 922(g)(9). However, unlike
the provisions at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the domestic
violence firearms prohibition contains an explicit jurisdictional
element, requiring that the gun or one of its parts has crossed
state lines. 22  Ultimately, these Commerce Clause challenges
uniformly failed at the appellate level. 23
Because the firearms prohibition applies to misdemeanor
convictions that occurred prior to the enactment of section
922(g)(9), another common claim focused on the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Defendants whose convictions (and sometimes firearms
purchases) occurred prior to the law's enactment challenged the
provision as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, arguing that they
were being punished for behavior that took place prior to the law's
existence. 24 However, these challenges also consistently failed
because, as one Court of Appeals stated:
It is immaterial that [defendant]'s firearm purchase and
domestic violence conviction occurred prior to § 922(g)(9)'s
enactment because the conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(9)
is the possession of a firearm. As it is undisputed that
[defendant] possessed the firearm after the enactment of
§ 922(g)(9), the law's application to [him] does not run
U.S.C. § 13981, created a federal civil rights remedy for gender-motivated
violence. Id. at 601-02.
22. Section 922(g)(9) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., who has been convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.
See also Lininger, supra note 19, at 545, 559.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Costigan, 18 F. App'x 2, 4 (1st Cir. 2001); Fraternal
Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See also
United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 214 (2d Cir. 2001).
24. See, e.g., Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 594. See also Lynce v. Mathis, 519
U.S. 433, 441 (1997) ("To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must
be retrospective-that is, 'it must apply to events occurring before its
enactment'-and it 'must disadvantage the offender affected by it' by altering
the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the
crime." (citation omitted) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29
(1981))).
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afoul of the ex post facto prohibition. 2 5
Defendants also attacked the statute on Due Process Clause
grounds, arguing that it did not provide fair warning that
continuing possession of firearms after a domestic violence
misdemeanor conviction was illegal. This claim too was
unsuccessful in the appellate courts, which found that the statute
made clear that possession of a firearm after conviction for a
domestic violence misdemeanor was unlawful and further that
"ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal
prosecution." 26 In a related claim pertaining to the knowledge
requirement of the statute, the appellate courts found that the
"knowing" mens rea did not require that the defendant have
knowledge that his conduct was illegal, but simply that he have
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 27 Other claims
25. United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted). Other courts also rejected such ex post facto challenges to
section 922(g)(9) on similar grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Pfeifer, 371
F.3d 430, 436-37 (8th Cir. 2004); Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 594.
26. United States v. Denis, 297 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 322-23; United States v. Beavers, 206
F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1999). In Denis, as in other similar cases, the
defendant argued that conviction under section 922(g)(9) fell within an
exception to this principle recognized by the Supreme Court in Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 297 F.3d at 28. In Lambert, a Los Angeles
ordinance criminally punished felons who remained in the City more than
five days without registering with the police. 355 U.S. at 226. The Supreme
Court held that, because the defendant had no notice that failure to register
would subject him to criminal prosecution, this provision violated due
process. Id. at 229-30. However, in Denis, the First Circuit rejected this
claim, finding that Lambert has had a very narrow application and did not
apply to the situation addressed by the court, which involved the affirmative
act of possessing the gun, as opposed to the passive conduct at issue in
Lambert. 297 F.3d at 29. Further, unlike the Lambert defendant, whose
simple presence in a city was presumptively innocent, the defendant's
behavior in Denis, possession of a firearm after a domestic violence
conviction, was a "'circumstance [ which might move one to inquire' as to any
applicable regulations or prohibitions." Id. at 30 (alteration in original)
(quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 967-68 (8th Cir.
2000); Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 322. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) is the provision
which states the penalties for those who "knowingly" violate section 922(g).
In Bryan v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that "the knowledge
requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as
distinguished from knowledge of the law." 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998) (quoting
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 345 (1952) (Jackson,
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included arguments that the provision constituted a "bill of
attainder," violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment for the underlying misdemeanor
offense, violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating domestic
violence misdemeanants differently from other misdemeanants,
and violated the Tenth Amendment by usurping powers reserved
for the states; all of these were rejected by the appellate courts. 28
B. The Supreme Court and United States v. Hayes
Though the challenges discussed above were settled at the
federal appellate level, section 922(g)(9) first came to the Supreme
Court in United States v. Hayes, focusing on the question of the
definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 29 The gun
ban of section 922(g)(9) applies to defendants who have been
convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," which is
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) to include any offense that:
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law;
and
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon,
committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim
shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting
with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent,
or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim. 3 0
The issue before the Court in Hayes involved the relationship
requirement of section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii); as the Court put it, the
question was whether this definition "cover[ed] a misdemeanor
battery whenever the battered victim was in fact the offender's
spouse (or other relation specified in § 921(a)(33)(A)) ... [or] to
trigger the possession ban, must the predicate misdemeanor
J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that
"unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term 'knowingly'
merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."
Id. at 193.
28. See Lininger, supra note 19, at 561, 563 (discussing various claims).
29. 555 U.S. 415, 418 (2009).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2012).
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identify as an element of the crime a domestic relationship
between aggressor and victim?"3 1
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held
that the former definition was correct and that a domestic
relationship between the offender and victim need not be an
element of the crime; instead, it is enough for the government to
charge and prove a prior conviction for an offense that was in fact
committed by a defendant against a spouse or other domestic
victim.32
In reaching this decision, the Court first examined the text
and grammatical structure of the definitional statute. 33 It then
found that interpreting the statute to require the domestic
relationship as an element of the misdemeanor offense would
frustrate Congress' purpose in enacting section 922(g)(9) because
most of the states did not have criminal statutes that specifically
prohibited domestic violence; thus, the gun ban would have been a
"dead letter" in two-thirds of the states at the time of its
enactment. 3 4 Finally, the Court found that the rule of lenity,
which interprets criminal statutes narrowly in favor of a
defendant, applied only when, after utilizing traditional principles
of statutory interpretation, a statute is ambiguous. 3 5 Here, "It]he
text, context, purpose, and what little there is of drafting history
all point in the same direction"; therefore, the statute was not
ambiguous, and Congress defined "misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence" to include offenses committed by a person with a
31. Hayes, 555 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 420-26. The Court noted that section 921(a)(33)(A) used the
word "element" in the singular, suggesting that it meant only the use of force,
which follows immediately thereafter, to be a required element and not the
offender's relationship with the victim: "Had Congress meant to make the
latter as well as the former an element of the predicate offense, it likely
would have used the plural 'elements,' as it has done in other offense-defining
provisions." Id. at 421-22. The Court also noted that treating the
relationship between the parties as a required element was awkward "as a
matter of syntax." Id. at 422.
34. Id. at 426-27 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 762
(4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, J., dissenting)). The Court noted that additional
states had enacted such statutes since the legislation was passed, but as of
2009, about one-half of the states still prosecuted domestic violence
exclusively under generally applicable criminal laws. Id. at 427 n.8.
35. Id. at 429.
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domestic relationship to the victim, whether or not such a
relationship was an element of the crime. 36
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in
Hayes.37  Chief Justice Roberts argued, based on text and
structure, that the most natural reading of the statute would be
for the domestic relationship to be included as a required element
of the offense, and "it would be at least surprising to find.., that
,a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' need not by its terms
have anything to do with domestic violence." 38 The dissent also
noted that the majority's approach would be difficult to apply
because often it would be necessary to go beyond the conviction
itself to determine whether the offense on its facts involved
domestic violence. 39 Further, the dissent argued that the statute
was ambiguous, making it a strong case for application of the rule
of lenity. 40
A key point of dispute between the majority and the
dissenting Justices centered on the use of legislative history to
discern congressional intent.41 Chief Justice Roberts contested
the majority's use of legislative history, focusing on the floor
statement of the bill's chief sponsor, Senator Lautenberg. 42 He
argued that this "tidbitH [did] not amount to much," because the
statement was delivered the day the legislation was passed and
after the House of Representatives had already passed the
pertinent provision. 43 Further, whatever Senator Lautenberg's
purpose, it was not necessarily shared by Congress as a whole in
passing the legislation. 44 Legislators may have had differing
views on the reach of the new law, and some may have been
willing to agree to the gun prohibition, but only if the predicate
misdemeanor required that the domestic relationship was an
36. Id.
37. Id. at 430-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 431.
39. Id. at 435-36.
40. Id. at 436 ("Taking a fair view, the text of § 921(a)(33)(A) is
ambiguous, the structure leans in the defendant's favor, the purpose leans in
the Government's favor, and the legislative history does not amount to much.
This is a textbook case for application of the rule of lenity.").
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element of the offense. 45
The majority and dissent in Hayes thus disagreed about
methods of statutory interpretation. However, on another level,
the Justices' argument related to how broadly they would permit a
domestic violence law to apply. Must a crime of domestic violence
be limited to the relatively few number of states that specifically
demarcate "domestic violence crimes" in their statutes, or can a
crime of domestic violence be identified as any one of a variety of
crimes that exist throughout the criminal code, as long as the
defendant had a domestic relationship with the victim? The
dissent's approach would have confined what is considered a
"crime of domestic violence" to the narrow category of crimes that
are specifically delineated as such. 46 As Chief Justice Roberts
expressed his view, to him it was "surprising" and
"counterintuitive" that a "crime of domestic violence" need not
have domestic violence as an element. 4 7
However, the majority's holding encompassed a wide range of
crimes within the category of "crime of domestic violence."4 8 This
of course had the immediate impact of permitting a broader
application of section 922(g)(9); but further, the Court
demonstrated a more expansive vision of what is considered a
domestic violence crime. The fight over this vision of domestic
violence would come back to the Court just a few years later, when
it considered the firearms ban again in United States v.
Castleman.49
III. THE CASTLEMAN DECISION
As in Hayes, the issue in Castleman centered on the definition
of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 50 However, the
question in Castleman focused on the first part of 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(A)(ii)-what kind of conduct could be considered "the
use or attempted use of physical force," a required element of a
qualifying misdemeanor crime. 5 1 In an opinion authored by
45. See id. at 435.
46. See id. at 431-37.
47. Id. at 431, 436-37.
48. See id. at 420-26 (majority opinion).
49. 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).
50. Id. at 1408.
51. Id. at 1409. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for the
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Justice Sotomayor, the Court again gave a broad reading to the
domestic violence firearms prohibition, finding that "use of
physical force" in the statute incorporated the common law
definition of force-an expansive definition that included not only
violent force, but offensive touching. 52  As in Hayes, the
Castleman Court debated principles of statutory interpretation. 53
However, Castleman also returned to the deeper issue in Hayes:
how to conceive of domestic violence. 54 Even more explicitly than
in Hayes, the majority and concurring opinions battled over this
core issue-the meaning of domestic violence itself.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The Court first turned to principles of statutory interpretation
to determine the meaning of the "use of physical force," which was
part of the federal law's definition of "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence." 55 It relied on a principle of interpretation that
"absent other indication, 'Congress intends to incorporate the well-
settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses."' 56 It found
that there was no such "other indication" here, so that Congress
intended to incorporate the common law meaning of force into
section 921(a)(33)(A)'s definition of a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence." 57 Because the common law meaning of force
included "offensive touching," rather than only more violent forms
of force, 58 the Court's holding resulted in a broad reading of
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" and, thus, broader
applicability of the section 922(g)(9) firearms prohibition.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished a similar
provision that it had considered in Johnson v. United States.59 In
language of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).





56. Id. at 1410 (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724
(2013)).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.; Johnson, 559 U.S. 133.
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Johnson, the issue was whether a battery conviction qualified as a
"violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act; the Act
defined "violent felony" as one that "has as an element the use ...
of physical force."6 0 The Court had noted in Johnson that at
common law, the element of force in the crime of battery included
offensive touching and stated the general principle that a common
law term of art should be given its usual meaning, except "where
that meaning does not fit."61 There, the Court found a "comical
misfit with the defined term."6 2 Therefore, when defining "violent
felony," the Court held that the phrase "physical force" did not
take on the broad common law meaning, but instead meant
"violent force."6 3 In Johnson, the Court explicitly reserved the
question of whether the definition of "physical force" for purposes
of interpreting "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal
Act should extend to the meaning of "physical force" required for
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under section
922(g)(9).6 4 In Castleman, the Court answered that question and
determined that the same definition of "physical force" did not
apply to the domestic violence firearms prohibition.6 5 Unlike in
Johnson, here the common law meaning of force "fits perfectly."6 6
In explaining the difference between the statute in Johnson
and this case, the Court first made a distinction between felony
and misdemeanor offenses.6 7 Because the common law definition
of force applied specifically to misdemeanors, it was not likely that
Congress meant to incorporate that meaning into the definition of
a "violent felony" in Johnson; in contrast, "it makes sense for
Congress to have classified as a 'misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence' the type of conduct that supports a common-law battery
conviction," under which perpetrators of domestic violence are
routinely charged.6 8
The Court argued that another reason for distinguishing
60. 559 U.S. at 135 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)).
61. Id. at 139.
62. Id. at 145.
63. Id. at 140.
64. Id. at 143-44; see also United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405,
1410 n.3 (2014).
65. 134 S. Ct. at 1410.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1411.
68. Id.
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Johnson was that a determination that a defendant's crime was a
"violent felony" would classify him as an "armed career criminal";
in contrast, the statute at issue in Castleman grouped those
convicted of "misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence" with
others banned from gun possession who are not necessarily
violent, such as substance abuse addicts, those who have entered
the United States under a nonimmigrant visa, and those who have
renounced United States citizenship. 6 9 Therefore, according to the
Court, there was "no anomaly in grouping domestic abusers
convicted of generic assault or battery offenses together with the
others whom § 922(g) disqualifies from gun ownership." 70
Similar to an argument made in Hayes, the Court further
noted that a narrow reading of the statute would have rendered it
inoperative in many states at the time it was enacted. 7 1 Assault
or battery laws under which domestic violence abusers were
routinely prosecuted can be grouped into two categories: those
that prohibit both offensive touching and the causation of bodily
injury, and those that prohibit only the causation of bodily
injury.7 2  Therefore, if offensive touching does not qualify as
"force," then the federal domestic violence gun ban would have
been inoperative in at least ten states, making up nearly thirty
percent of the nation's population at time of its enactment. 7 3
Relying on statutory interpretation, the Court therefore found
good reason to give an expansive reading to "force" and, thus, to
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under the statute. 74
Applying this standard, the Court held that Castleman's prior
69. Id. at 1412 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1413.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1410-13. The majority also rejected what it called other
"nontextual" arguments made by Castleman. Id. at 1415. For example, the
defendant argued that the legislative history of the statute suggested that
Congress did not intend for it to apply to acts involving minimal force. Id.
The Court found this argument unpersuasive, stating there was nothing in
the "isolated references" of legislators to severe domestic violence that
suggested they would not have wanted the statute to apply to a misdemeanor
assault conviction like the defendant's. Id. The Court similarly rejected
Castleman's rule of lenity argument, finding that the rule applies only when
a statue is ambiguous after considering text, structure, history, and purpose.
Id. at 1416. The Court stated simply "that [this] is not the case here." Id.
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conviction qualified as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence." 75
B. The Meaning of Domestic Violence
But the Court went further in justifying its broad reading of
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," and, in doing so, it
expressed a refined and accurate understanding of the concept of
domestic violence. Instead of viewing "domestic" simply as a
descriptive term modifying the noun violence, the majority opinion
understood "domestic violence" as an independent concept:
[W]hereas the word "violent" or "violence" standing alone
"connotes a substantial degree of force," that is not true of
"domestic violence." "Domestic violence" is not merely a
type of "violence"; it is a term of art encompassing acts
that one might not characterize as "violent" in a
nondomestic context.... Minor uses of force may not
75. Id. at 1413. The Court first employed the "categorical approach," in
which it looked to the statute to determine whether the defendant's
conviction necessarily had the element of the "use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon." Id. at 1413
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S.
13 (2005); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)). The Tennessee
statute made it a crime to "commit an assault" against a family member and
incorporated by reference another statute that defined three types of assault:
"1) intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to another; 2)
intentionally or knowingly causing another to reasonably fear imminent
bodily injury; or 3) intentionally or knowingly causing physical contact with
another in a manner that a reasonable person would regard as extremely
offensive or provocative." Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111(b)
(2010); id. § 39-13-101(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
acknowledged that it did not appear that every type of assault under these
definitions would necessarily involve the use or attempted use of physical
force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, even under the Court's broad
reading. Id. For example, the reckless causation of bodily injury may not be
a "use" of force. Id. at 1414. However, the parties did not contest that the
Tennessee law was a "divisible statute," meaning that the Court may apply a
"modified categorical approach" and look at the indictment to which the
defendant pled guilty to determine whether his actual conviction did include
the elements necessary to qualify for the federal offense. Id. Here, he pled
guilty to "intentionally or knowingly" causing bodily injury, and the knowing
or intentional causation of bodily injury does necessarily involve the use of
physical force, as the Court has defined it. Id. at 1414-15. Since the
indictment made clear that use of physical force was an element of his
conviction, it was a qualifying "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id.
at 1415.
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constitute "violence" in the generic sense. For example, in
an opinion that we cited in Johnson, the Seventh Circuit
noted that it was "hard to describe ... as 'violence"' "a
squeeze of the arm [that] causes a bruise." But an act of
this nature is easy to describe as "domestic violence,"
when the accumulation of such acts over time can subject
one intimate partner to the other's control.76
The Court thus recognized that domestic violence is in essence a
course of conduct through which the abuser exercises power and
control over his victim; it is a series and pattern of behaviors and
not simply a sum of discrete acts of violence. Domestic violence is
not merely generic violence exhibited in a particular locale or by a
perpetrator with a particular relationship to his victim. It is this
pattern of domination, and not a particular level of violent force,
that is central to the concept of domestic violence.
This recognition permits wider application of the domestic
violence gun ban because a greater range of prior convictions will
qualify as "misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence." But
further, the Court's recognition of domestic violence as a pattern
of behavior with particular dynamics, rather than as discrete
incidents of generic violence, has the potential to affect the
treatment of a range of legal issues both at the Supreme Court
level and in the lower courts. Just a few examples demonstrate
this potential. This conception of domestic violence as a course of
76. Id. at 1411-12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350
F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2003)). For this reason, the Court also distinguished
its decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). Id. at 1415. In Leocal,
the Court considered the meaning of a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. §
16, which the statute defined in part as one "that has as an element the
use ... of physical force." 543 U.S. at 8-12; 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012). The
Court stated that the ordinary meaning of "crime of violence" "suggests a
category of violent, active crimes." Id. at 11. In Castleman, the Court noted
that the lower courts have generally held that mere offensive touching cannot
constitute the physical force necessary for a "crime of violence," similar to the
holding in Johnson, which held that it could not constitute the physical force
necessary for a "violent felony." 134 S. Ct. at 1411 n.4; see also generally
Johnson, 559 U.S. 133. However, the Court noted that these interpretations
of "crime of violence" did not apply to "misdemeanor crimes of domestic
violence" because "'domestic violence' encompasses a range of force broader
than that which constitutes 'violence' simpliciter." Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at
1411 n.4.
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conduct and an "accumulation of... acts over time"77 could
influence the determination of what constitutes an "ongoing
emergency" and, therefore, what statements are non-testimonial
for Confrontation Clause purposes. 7 8 This understanding also
could affect the legal treatment of "imminence" and
"reasonableness" in self-defense claims by defendants who are
victims of domestic violence. And, it could influence the courts'
determination of how the presence of domestic violence should be
weighed in a custody or child protection decision. In short, a more
accurate legal understanding of domestic violence could help give
effect to the actual experiences of domestic violence victims and
ensure that they are treated more fairly by the legal system in a
variety of contexts. 7 9
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia agreed that under the facts of this case, the
charge to which Castleman pled, "intentionally or knowing
causing bodily injury" to a family member, had the use of physical
force as an element and so constituted a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence" under the statute.8 0  However, he "reach[ed]
that conclusion on narrower grounds" and so wrote separately to
concur only in part and in the judgment.8 1
Justice Scalia would have found that the same meaning of
physical force used in Johnson applied to the statute here and
encompassed the conduct to which Castleman pled.8 2 In Johnson,
the Court concluded that physical force meant violent force-that
is, "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
77. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412.
78. See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
79. See SCHNEIDER, HANNA, SACK & GREENBERG, supra note 18, at 202
("A central challenge facing lawyers in this field is to translate the complexity
of battering experiences into law .... [T]he legal system has historically
denied or minimized abuse in intimate relationships, and focused on single
incidents of violence rather than grappling with the broader context in which
these incidents occur. To put it simply, domestic violence has been invisible
or distorted in many legal cases in which it is relevant.").
80. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1416 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1416-17.
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person."83 Justice Scalia argued that if physical force was given
the same meaning here, this was an "easy case" because "it is
impossible to cause bodily injury without using force 'capable of
producing that result."84 Therefore, Justice Scalia concluded that
Castleman's conviction qualified as a "misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence" under that definition.8 5
Justice Scalia, however, objected to the majority's broader
interpretation of physical force in the domestic violence firearms
statute and to its incorporation of the common law definition of
force, which includes offensive touching.S6 He argued that there
was no reason to interpret the phrase "use of physical force"
differently in this case than it was interpreted in Johnson.8 7
Justice Scalia made several arguments to contest the majority's
reasoning on this issue. 88
He argued that the principle of statutory interpretation relied
upon by the majority, in which it is presumed that "absent other
indication, 'Congress intend[ed] to incorporate the well-settled
meaning of the common-law terms it uses,"' was of "limited
relevance" in this case, because there was such "other indication"
here-the contesting presumption of consistent usage, that when
Congress uses the same language, it means the same thing.8 9
Since the Court had already found that the common law meaning
of force was not incorporated into the phrase "use of physical
force" in the statute at issue in Johnson, this presumption meant
that Congress also did not intend to incorporate it into the
domestic violence statute, which used very similar language.
Justice Scalia also rejected the Court's argument that any
interpretation excluding offensive touching would have rendered
the gun ban inoperative in many states at the time of its
83. Id. at 1416 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 1416-17.
85. Id. at 1417.
86. Id. at 1416-22.
87. Id. at 1418. Justice Scalia also objected to interpreting the phrase
differently than it was interpreted in Leocal, which considered use of physical
force to define "crime of violence." Id. See discussion of Leocal supra note 76.
88. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1418-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
in the judgment).
89. Id. at 1418 (quoting id. at 1410 (majority opinion)).
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enactment. 90 He argued that "there is no interpretive principle to
the effect that statutes must be given their broadest possible
interpretation," and in any event under the narrower
interpretation, the statute "would have had effect in four-fifths of
the States."9 1  Justice Scalia found it more plausible that
Congress enacted a statute that had effect in this large majority of
states and "left it to the handful of nonconforming States to
change their laws (as some have)," than that "Congress adopted a
meaning of 'domestic violence' that included the slightest
unwanted touching." 92
Justice Scalia also countered the distinction the majority
made between the misdemeanor crime at issue here and the felony
crime interpreted in Johnson.9 3 He argued that the term being
considered here was not simply a "misdemeanor crime," but a
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence."94 According to Justice
Scalia, consideration of this full term leads to the "unremarkable
conclusion that 'physical force' in [the domestic violence statute]
refers to the type of force involved in violent misdemeanors (such
as bodily-injury offenses) rather than nonviolent ones (such as
offensive touching)." 95 As indicated by this argument, in contrast
to the majority's approach, Justice Scalia viewed domestic violence
merely as a type of violence. He made this position explicit in his
final argument, in which he took on the Court's statement that
domestic violence encompasses a range of force and a pattern of
conduct.96
D. Justice Scalia's "'Absurdity"
It is apparent that Justice Scalia's core disagreement with the
majority focused on the Court's discussion of the meaning of
domestic violence, as he wrote extensively and vociferously on this
point. He called the majority's definition of domestic violence in
which, as he put it, "an act need not be violent to qualify as
90. Id. at 1418-19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
91. Id. at 1418.
92. Id. at 1419.
93. Id. at 1419-20.
94. Id. at 1420.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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'domestic violence,"' an "absurdity."97  Further, he found it
inconsistent with definitions of "domestic violence" from the period
of the statute's enactment, relying on dictionary definitions such
as "violence between members of a household, usu. spouses; an
assault or other violent act committed by one member of a
household against another."98  Justice Scalia stated that
contemporary dictionaries gave domestic violence the same
meaning, which he phrased as "ordinary violence that occurs in a
domestic context."99
He argued that the Court relied for its definition of domestic
violence on an amicus brief filed by the National Network to End
Domestic Violence and other anti-domestic violence organizations,
as well as publications from the U.S. Department of Justice's
Office on Violence Against Women. 10 0 He dismissed the amicus
brief as providing a series of definitions drawn from "law review
articles, foreign-government bureaus and similar sources," which
included a range of both nonviolent and nonphysical conduct that
he said "cannot possibly be relevant to the meaning of a statute
requiring 'physical force,' or to the legal meaning of 'domestic
violence' (as opposed to the meaning desired by private and
governmental advocacy groups)."101 He referred to the
Department of Justice's definition as "equally capacious and (to
put it mildly) unconventional," including "a pattern of abusive
behavior ... used by one partner to gain or maintain power and
control over another." 10 2
Justice Scalia attacked the amici organizations as having a
"vested interest in expanding the definition of 'domestic violence'
in order to broaden the base of individuals eligible for support
services;" as an example, he explained that the amicus National
Network to End to Domestic Violence had advocated for expansion
of a program assisting victims of domestic violence to include
victims of "dating violence" in order to "ensure that all victims in
danger can access services." 103  By using the term "vested
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1564 (7th ed. 1999)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1420-21.
101. Id. at 1421.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1422 & n.10.
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interest," Justice Scalia seemed to imply that these organizations
would be improperly motivated to provide an inaccurately broad
definition of domestic violence; however, as his own example
demonstrates, the "vested interest" of these organizations is to
define domestic violence accurately so that it encompasses all
victims who require services. 104
Justice Scalia also spoke dismissively of what he called the
"Department of Justice's (nonprosecuting) Office [on Violence
Against Women]."105 He noted that the Department of Justice,
which of course is charged with enforcing the statute at issue
here, "thankfully receives no deference in our interpretation of the
criminal laws whose claimed violation the Department of Justice
prosecutes."106 And, though he could not call the Department of
Justice an advocacy organization with a "vested interest," he did
lump it with the amici to find that they all had what seemed to
him to be a questionable purpose. 10 7 According to him, these
groups were,
entitled to define "domestic violence" any way they want
for their own purposes -purposes that can include (quite
literally) giving all domestic behavior harmful to women a
bad name. (What is more abhorrent than violence against
women?) But when they (and the Court) impose their all-
embracing definition on the rest of us, they not only
distort the law, they impoverish the language. When
everything is domestic violence, nothing is. Congress will
have to come up with a new word (I cannot imagine what
it would be) to denote actual domestic violence. 108
It is hard to know exactly how to interpret this statement from
Justice Scalia. It could be read as disdain or sarcasm "what is
more abhorrent than violence against women?" But whatever his
intent, this invective betrays Justice Scalia's lack of
understanding of domestic violence. It is not that "everything is
104. As the majority opinion stated, these are the organizations "most
directly engaged with the problem and thus most aware of its dimensions."
Id. at 1412 (majority opinion).
105. Id. at 1421 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
106. Id. at 1422.
107. Id. at 1421.
108. Id.
148 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 20:128
domestic violence;" rather, in failing to comprehend the widely-
accepted meaning of the term as a pattern of abusive behavior
designed to gain power and control, he is uninformed. 109
Justice Scalia's failure to understand the meaning of domestic
violence is highly troubling. In Castleman, he stood alone in
attacking the Court's conception of domestic violence. 1 10
However, it is unlikely that this struggle over the legal meaning of
domestic violence is over at the Court. Justice Scalia has
authored many important opinions involving domestic violence, 1 11
109. He revealed this lack of education in another portion of his opinion
when he referred to a principle of statutory interpretation as a "rule of
thumb." Id. at 1417. For those familiar with the history of the legal
treatment of domestic violence, this phrase is jarring because it is understood
to represent the old common law principle that a man had the right of
moderate chastisement-that is, the legal right to beat his wife as long as he
used a switch no thicker than his thumb. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 2 (1982), available at
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr 12w8410.pdf.
There is some dispute over whether the term "rule of thumb" had its origins
in the context of wife-beating. See, e.g., Marina Angel, Criminal Law and
Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who
Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 256 n.205 (1996); Phyllis
Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction
of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582,
598 n.83 (1996); Henry Ansgar Kelley, Rule of Thumb and the Folklore of the
Husband's Stick, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 341, 342-44 (1994). However, it is clear
that the concept was utilized in several legal cases involving domestic
violence in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156,
157 (1824) (discussing the doctrine of "moderate correction" and the use of a
whip or rattan; "no bigger than my thumb, in order to enforce the salutary
restraints of domestic discipline"); State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 44, 45 (1874) ("The
doctrine of years ago, that a husband had the right to whip his wife, provided
he used a switch no longer than his thumb, no longer governs decisions of our
courts."); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 454 (1868) ("The Defendant had a
right to whip his wife with a switch no bigger than his thumb.").
110. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote separately to concur in
the judgment on different grounds. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1422 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito had dissented in Johnson, arguing
that physical force under the statute in that case should have included the
common law meaning of force. 559 U.S. 133, 146-53 (2010) (Aito, J.,
dissenting). In Castleman, he argued that the meaning of the language in
the domestic violence statute was the same as his interpretation of the
statute at issue in Johnson. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1422 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Therefore, he would not have extended the
reasoning of Johnson to the question here. Id.
111. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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and no doubt, he will continue to be a powerful voice in this area.
Yet the Castleman majority's expression of the meaning domestic
violence marks an important development and provides a
competing conception to the view articulated by Justice Scalia.
IV. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 922(G)(9) AND THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT
In Castleman, the domestic violence firearms ban withstood
yet another legal challenge. However, though this is the most
recent in a long line of attacks, it may not be the last. The
Supreme Court's recent Second Amendment rulings may have
created yet another route to challenge section 922(g)(9).
In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that
the Second Amendment afforded an individual the right to keep
and bear arms and that statutes that ban handgun possession in
the home, or those that ban operable firearms in the home for the
immediate purpose of self-defense, are unconstitutional. 112 In
McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court found that this right was
fully applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause. 1 13
In both decisions, however, the Court made clear that this Second
Amendment right was "not unlimited." 114 As the Court stated in
Heller:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 115
The Court made clear that this list was meant only to provide
examples and was not exhaustive. 1 1 6 However, since Heller, there
112. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
113. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
114. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
115. Id. at 626-27; accord McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller
language and noting that "[d]espite municipal respondents' doomsday
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating
firearms").
116. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. ("We identify these presumptively
lawful regulatory measures only as examples: our list does not purport to be
exhaustive.").
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has been a new set of challenges to section 922(g)(9), seeking to
test its constitutionality on Second Amendment grounds. Though
there have been disagreements on such issues as the standard of
review, thus far, all of the Courts of Appeal that have considered
the constitutionality of section 922(g)(9) post-Heller have upheld
the domestic violence gun ban against Second Amendment
challenges. 117 Courts have reasoned that "both logic and data"
established a substantial relation between the state's interest in
preventing armed domestic violence and the statute banning
firearms for those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. 118
However, not all circuits have weighed in on this issue.
Further, the circuits, and ultimately, the Supreme Court's
determination of the Second Amendment issue may be impacted
by the Castleman holding. Whether the statute serves an
important enough state interest and is strongly enough related to
that interest, may be affected by the Court's broad reading of "use
of physical force." For example, in the pre-Castleman case of
United States v. Engstrum, a federal district court in Utah, using
strict scrutiny review in a Second Amendment challenge to section
922(g)(9), found the statute narrowly tailored to the government's
compelling interest in protecting household members from those
who pose a risk of violence. 119 The court's ruling was based in
part on the fact that the Tenth Circuit had, at that time, required
physical force under the statute to have "some degree of power or
violence." 120 Now, with the broader definition given to physical
force by the Supreme Court in Castleman, the argument that the
statute does not serve as important an interest or is not narrowly
enough tailored to meet that interest may be strengthened. 121 A
117. See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Staten,
666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.
2010) (en banc); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010).
118. See, e.g., Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
119. 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1234-35 (D. Utah 2009).
120. Id.; accord Staten, 666 F.3d at 162-63 (making a similar point as to
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of "use of physical force" and it's relevance
to the Second Amendment analysis). See also Elizabeth Coppolecchia et al.,
Note, United States v. White: Disarming Domestic Violence Misdemeanants
Post-Heller, 64 U. MiAMi L. REV. 1505, 1524-25 (2010) (pointing out a
connection between the definition of the physical force requirement and a
Second Amendment challenge).
121. In Castleman, the Court summarily rejected a brief argument made
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direct challenge to section 922(g)(9) on Second Amendment
grounds post-Castleman may be the next chapter in the long
history of challenges to this statute.
In the meantime, however, the Court now has articulated a
concept of the legal meaning of domestic violence that is more
consistent with our actual understanding of domestic violence
dynamics, and which can impact the outcomes of a number of legal
issues in criminal, evidence, and family law, both at the Supreme
Court level and in the lower courts. This is a significant
development and is likely the most lasting and hopeful legacy of
Castleman.
by Castleman that the statute should be read narrowly because "it implicates
his constitutional right to keep and bear arms." 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1416 (2014).
However, Castleman did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute on
these grounds, and the Court said that "the meaning of the statute is
sufficiently clear that we need not indulge Castleman's cursory nod to
constitutional avoidance concerns." Id.
